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FORMER EMPLOYEES' RIGHT TO RELIEF UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Donna L. Mack
Abstract: The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) does not state whether a former
employee may sue a former employer regarding post-employment fringe benefits. Some
courts have held that former employees who are retired or have total disabilities have no right
to relief under the statute because they do not meet the ADA's requirement that a claimant be
a "qualified individual with a disability." Other courts have concluded that former employees
receiving post-employment benefits do have a right to relief under the statute. These courts
reasoned that an internal ambiguity in the statute requires courts to look to the legislative
history and purpose of the ADA, and construe the statute in accord with its broad remedial
purpose. This Comment argues that post-employment benefits recipients have a right to relief
under the ADA. The ADA expressly prohibits discrimination in terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment; individuals must have legal recourse when faced with this type of
discrimination. By broadly construing the employment relationship to include individuals
who no longer work but continue to receive benefits from a former employer, the "qualified
individual with a disability" requirement is satisfied and does not stand as an artificial barrier
to relief under the ADA.
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)'
to stamp out pervasive societal discrimination against people with
disabilities.2 The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating based on
disability in virtually all aspects of employment, including fringe
benefits.' Yet, consider the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Gonzales v.
Garner Food Services, Inc. that the ADA's protection did not extend to
Timothy Bourgeois, a former employee receiving discriminatory post-
employment benefits.4 Bourgeois worked for Garner Food Services
(GFS) until GFS learned that Bourgeois was being treated for AIDS.
Shortly thereafter, GFS fired Bourgeois to avoid paying future insurance
claims stemming from his AIDS treatment;' however, Bourgeois
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994)).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
3. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 54-55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 303,336-37. The
ADA "sets forth prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of disability by employers.., with
regard to hiring and all terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.... This section is intended to
include the range of employment decisions... includ[ing] ... fringe benefits available by virtue of
employment." Id. The ADA also prohibits discrimination in areas such as public services and public
accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, 12181-12189.
4. 89 F.3d 1523, 1531 (1 lth Cir. 1996).
5. Id. at 1524.
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continued to participate in the GFS health insurance plan after his
termination.6 While Bourgeois was collecting post-employment health
care benefits, GFS amended the health plan to limit AIDS-related
treatment, in part as a result of Bourgeois's continued participation in the
plan.7 After Bourgeois's death, his estate sued GFS, claiming GFS
violated the ADA by reducing benefits on the basis of Bourgeois's
disability.8 The district court dismissed the claim, and on appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that although GFS's deliberate reduction
in benefits could violate the ADA,9 Bourgeois had no right to relief
because the ADA's protection does not extend to former employees."
Gonzales illustrates the problem that arises when an employee who
has a total disability or is retired is finally in a position to use benefits
earned by virtue of previous employment, but finds that the insurance,
disability, or retirement plan discriminates based on disability. By
barring employees from bringing claims because they are no longer
employed, courts deny such employees the full rights granted by the
ADA." Circuits disagree on whether the ADA protects former employees
who allege that post-employment benefits are discriminatory. 2
6. Id. Bourgeois continued to participate in GFS's health insurance plan pursuant to a provision of
the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1161 (1998).
COBRA requires employers to allow former employees the option of continuing health insurance
coverage after termination of employment.
7. Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1524.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1525. Indeed, it is likely that deliberately reducing benefits violated the ADA. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with enforcing Title I of the
ADA, has determined that benefit reductions adopted for discriminatory reasons violate the ADA.
See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.5 (1998); see also Cutting Benefits for AIDS Violates ADA,
EEOC Determines, 25 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at I (Feb. 9, 1993).
10. Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1530-31.
11. Section 12201(c) of the ADA clarifies that the statute does not prohibit insurance or benefit
plan providers from offering bona fide plans that differentiate in coverage based on recognized
standards of risk assessment. In other words, a benefit plan that provides different benefits for
different types of conditions or disabilities does not necessarily violate the ADA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12201(c) (1994). However, the lawfulness of a particular plan under the ADA is a separate issue
from whether or not a former employee may bring a claim to challenge a benefit plan. At least one
court has conflated the two issues, reasoning that because the benefit plan did not violate the ADA,
the former employee could not sue. See EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir.
1996). While the ultimate outcome in some cases may be that the ADA provides no relief to the
former employee alleging discriminatory benefits, it is important to distinguish between the issues of
merit and right to relief. The right to judicial recourse is crucial if the underlying claim has merit.
12. Compare Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1531, and CNA, 96 F.3d at 1045 (holding that former
employee with total disability has no right to relief under ADA because she is not "qualified
individual with a disability"), with Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 607 (3d Cir. 1998)
Former Employees' Rights Under ADA
This Comment argues that the ADA allows individuals to bring claims
against former employers alleging discriminatory decisions regarding
post-employment fringe benefits. Because the ADA protects fringe
benefits, former employees are entitled to judicial recourse when a
former employer discriminates in this arena. Furthermore, a proper
reading of the "qualified individual with a disability" requirement
affirms that it does not bar claims by former employees receiving post-
employment benefits. Courts that construe the requirement to exclude
former employees wrongly prevent those employees from pursuing their
statutorily conferred rights.
Part I of this Comment provides a background of the ADA's statutory
framework and legislative history. Part H examines the case law inter-
preting former employees' coverage under the ADA and other employ-
ment discrimination statutes. Part III argues that because Congress
included in the ADA the right to non-discriminatory fringe benefits, it
intended to give employees legal recourse to secure those rights. This
Comment concludes that the "qualified individual with a disability"
requirement does not prohibit former employees from bringing ADA
claims to enforce post-employment benefits.
I. STATUTORY DEFINITIONS AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE ADA
A. Statutory Framework
Congress enacted the ADA to provide clear and comprehensive
guidelines for eliminating discrimination against people with disabil-
ities.'3 Although the Act does not explicitly address whether former
employees are protected, Title I of the ADA broadly prohibits employ-
ment discrimination.14 Under Title I, a covered entity15 may not discrim-
inate on the basis of disability against a "qualified individual with a
(holding that ADA allows former employee with total disability to sue former employer regarding
discriminatory disability benefits), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999), and Castellano v. City of
New York, 142 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that former employee entitled to fringe benefits
is "qualified individual with a disability" for purpose of suing under ADA).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
15. "Covered entity" includes an employer, an employment agency, a labor organization, or a
joint labor-management committee. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2).
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disability"'6 in regard to "job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."' 7 A
"qualified individual with a disability"'8 is one who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, 9 can perform the essential functions of the
employment position.
Based on this statutory language, courts have developed a three-part
test to determine whether a claimant has established a prima facie case of
discrimination under the ADA. To prevail on an ADA claim, plaintiffs
must show that they have a disability, are otherwise qualified and able to
perform the essential functions of the job, and the employer unlawfully
discriminated on the basis of disability.20 The cases addressing former
employees' right to relief have focused on the second part of the test:
whether the would-be claimant was a qualified individual able to perform
the essential functions of the job.2'
B. Legislative History
The ADA's legislative history reflects Congress's intent to cover the
full range of employment decisions,22 including decisions regarding
fringe benefits available to employees by virtue of employment.23
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). While the statute does not explicitly state that it covers "fringe
benefits," courts have unanimously assumed such protection as a "term, condition or privilege of
employment." See infra Part III.A.1. The legislative history underlying the statute's enactment
confirms this interpretation. See infra Part I.B. Moreover, while the EEOC regulations, like the ADA
itself, do not address the former employee's right to sue, the regulations do expressly extend the
ADA's coverage to fringe benefits. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(f) (1998). In addition, the EEOC
regulations echo the comprehensive approach of Title I itself, forbidding discrimination against
qualified individuals with disabilities in all aspects of the employment relationship. See 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630, app. § 1630.4 (1998).
18. 42U.S.C. § 12111(8).
19. "Reasonable accommodation" by an employer includes making the physical facility accessible
to individuals with disabilities; modifying a job, work schedule, equipment, device, examination, or
training material or policy; providing qualified readers or interpreters; or making other
accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)-(10).
20. See, e.g., Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1526 (1 1th Cir. 1997); Aucutt v. Six
Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1318 (8th Cir. 1996); White v. York Int'l Corp., 45
F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1995).
21. See infra Part l.A.
22. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 54 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 336.
23. Id. at 54-55, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 336-37.
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Elaborating on the intended scope of the employment discrimination
provision, the House of Representatives' Report provides an extensive,
but not exclusive, list of employment decisions subject to the ADA's
protection that explicitly includes fringe benefits.24
The ADA's legislative history also explains the purpose of the
statute's "qualified individual with a disability" and "essential functions"
requirements. Both the House and Senate Reports clarify that the ADA
does not compel employers to hire, promote, or retain fundamentally
unqualified workers.' Congress did not intend the ADA to interfere with
employers' freedom to choose and maintain workers who are able to
perform job duties.26 Instead, Congress sought to prevent employers from
discriminating against qualified individuals on the basis of disability."
Similarly, the Committee Reports accompanying the legislation note that
the "essential functions" requirement ensures that employers can
maintain a qualified work force "able to perform the essential, i.e., the
non-marginal functions of the job in quesiton [sic]."'28 Employers may
not disqualify individuals with disabilities from employment simply
because the individual cannot perform some marginal job function
peripheral to that job's essential function.29
24. The House Report states:
mhe decisions covered [by Title I of the ADA] include: (1) recruitment, advertising, and the
processing of applications for employment; (2) hiring, upgrading, promotion, award of tenure,
demotion, transfer, layoff, termination, right of return from layoff, and rehiring; (3) rates of pay
or any other form of compensation and changes in compensation; (4)job assignment, job
classification, organizational structures, position descriptions, lines of progression, and seniority
lists; (5) leaves of absence, sick leave, or any other leave; (6)fringe benefits available by virtue
of employment, whether or not administered by the covered entity, (7) selection and financial
support for training, including apprenticeship, professional meetings, conferences, and other
related activities, and selection for leaves of absence to pursue training; and (8) employer-
sponsored activities, including social or recreational programs.
Id. (emphasis added).
25. Id at 55, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337; S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 26 (1989).
26. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337; S. Rep. No. 101-
116, at 26.
27. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337; S. Rep. No. 101-
116, at 26.
28. HR. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337; S. Rep. No. 101-
116, at 26.
29. H.R Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. at 337.
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF FORMER EMPLOYEES'
RIGHT TO RELIEF UNDER THE ADA AND OTHER STATUTES
The U.S. circuit courts are split regarding former employees' right to
relief under the ADA. The heart of the issue dividing the courts is
whether the "qualified individual with a disability" requirement denies
former employees the right to sue3" when they have a total disability or
are retired. The Second and Third Circuits have held that in light of the
ADA's ambiguity regarding former employees, the statute's broad
remedial purpose mandates coverage of former employees who receive
post-employment benefits.3 However, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
have precluded relief under the ADA based on the failure of individuals
with total disabilities to meet the "qualified individual with a disability"
32requirement.
Courts have also considered the question of former employees' right
to relief under other employment discrimination statutes. Most of the
cases interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),33
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),34 and the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)35 affirm that former employees have a right
to relief,36 although the sparse case law interpreting the Rehabilitation
Act of 197337 concludes otherwise.38
30. Some courts and litigants have framed this issue in terms of a former employee's "standing"
to sue under the ADA. See, e.g., Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 185-87 (6th Cir.
1996), vacated on reh "g, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (en bane); Bril v. Dean Witter, Discover &
Co., 986 F. Supp. 171, 173-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Graboski v. Giuliani, 937 F. Supp. 258, 265-66
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). However, as the Third Circuit noted in Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., the issue is
not one of standing, because the plaintiff suffered injury in fact and was "arguably within the zone of
interests regulated by the ADA." 145 F.3d 601, 604-05 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850
(1999). Instead, the issue is whether the ADA's protection extends to former employees, giving them
the right to sue under the statute. See EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 1996)
(reframing parties' "standing" argument as "right to relief").
31. Ford, 145 F.3d at 608; Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 1998).
32. CNA, 96 F.3d at 1043-45; Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1530-31
( lIth Cir. 1996).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h-6 (1994).
34. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (1998).
35. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (1998).
36. Prior to Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., courts were split over whether Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision protected former employees. 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). Robinson resolved that split in
favor of granting protection to former employees. See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
37. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796 (1998).
38. See infra Part II.B.2.
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A. Circuits Are Split on Whether Former Employees Have a Right to
Relief Under the ADA
Circuits differ regarding the ADA's coverage of former employees
receiving post-employment benefits.39 The crux of this disagreement
stems from the "qualified individual with a disability" requirement. The
Second and Third Circuits have found that the ADA's coverage of
former employees is ambiguous because the requirement that a plaintiff
be a "qualified individual with a disability" conflicts with the right to
nondiscriminatory fringe benefits, some of which are provided after
employment has ended.40 Thus, the Second and Third Circuits reasoned,
courts should liberally construe the provision in keeping with the ADA's
broad remedial purpose and grant former employees a right to relief.
39. Compare EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing to extend ADA
coverage to former employees), and Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523 (1 th Cir.
1996) (same), with Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998) (extending ADA
coverage to former employees), cert. denied, 119 S. CL 850 (1999), and Castellano v. City of New
York, 142 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1998) (same). Additionally, the Sixth Circuit held in Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. that former employees with total disabilities are not "qualified
individuals with disabilities," and therefore are unable to sue under the ADA. 99 F.3d 181, 183 (6th
Cir. 1996). However, this decision was vacated, and on rehearing the Title I issue was not raised. 121
F.3d 1006 (1997) (en banc); see also Fobarv. City of Dearborn Heights, 994 F. Supp. 878, 883 (E.D.
Mich. 1998) (concluding that despite ADA's protection of fringe benefits, it "does not apply to
people who are no longer able to perform the essential functions of their jobs"); Bril v. Dean Witter,
Discover & Co., 986 F. Supp. 171, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (concluding that former employee with total
disability is not qualified individual with disability and therefore lacked standing to challenge
discriminatory long-term disability benefits under ADA); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp.
1158, 1162-63 (E.D. Va. 1997) (recognizing that former employee with total disability has right to
bring claim against former employer and allege discriminatory disability benefits, and noting that
barring such claim would contravene purpose of ADA); Dickey v. Peoples Energy Corp., 955
F. Supp. 886, 889-90 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (rejecting "benefits recipient" as employment position under
ADA); Esfahani v. Medical College of Pa., 919 F. Supp. 832, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that
plaintiff can bring claim of discriminatory benefits only for period of time during which he was
qualified individual with disability; part of plaintiff's claim covering time he had total disability was
barred by ADA's "qualified individual with a disability" requirement); Agster v. Furnival/State
Mach. Co., No. CIV.A. 94-0654, 1995 WL 568488, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 1995) (finding that
former employee with total disability is not "qualified individual with disability" and therefore
cannot bring ADA claim challenging discriminatory post-employment health benefits); Foote v.
Folkes, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (holding that wife of former employee lacked
standing to sue under ADA because she herself was not employee, former employee, or job
applicant); Felde v. City of San Jose, 839 F. Supp. 708, 710-11 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding former
employer's payment of accrued sick time to retiree non-discriminatory but not addressing issue of
former employee's right to sue); Northen v. City of Chicago, 841 F. Supp. 234, 236 (N.D. [Il. 1993)
(determining that pleading stage was too early to say if ADA covers retirees).
40. Ford, 145 F.3d at 606; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 66-67.
41. Ford, 145 F.3d at 607; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 69.
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The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, have seen no such
ambiguity. These circuits were satisfied that the plain language of the
"qualified individual with a disability" requirement was sufficient to bar
relief to former employees who were unable to work because of total
disability or retirement.42
1. Some Circuits Have Concluded that Former Employees Have a
Right to Relief Under the ADA
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in Ford v. Schering-Plough
Corp. that the ADA allows former employees to sue former employers
alleging discrimination in disability benefits.43 The plaintiff in Ford
alleged that her former employer's disability benefits plan violated the
ADA because it provided greater coverage for physical disability than for
mental disability.' The Third Circuit recognized an internal contra-
diction in the ADA.45 Although the statute protects only qualified
individuals with disabilities, it expressly prohibits employers from
discriminating in the "terms, conditions and privileges of employment,"'
including such fringe benefits as disability plans.47 Reading Title I to
protect only currently employable qualified individuals with disabilities
would wrongly deny former employees with disabilities judicial recourse
to effectuate their rights to non-discriminatory disability benefits under
the ADA.48
The Ford court found that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. 49 added to the ambiguity surrounding former
employees' eligibility to sue under the ADA.50 In Robinson, the Court
affirmed that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision covered former
42. CNA, 96 F.3d at 1043-45; Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1530-3 1.
43. 145 F.3d at 608. Despite holding that the ADA indeed permitted the plaintiff to sue, the court
concluded that the ADA does not require that benefits plans equally cover mental and physical
disabilities. Id. The court stated that "[s]o long as every employee is offered the same plan regardless
of that employee's contemporary or future disability status, then no discrimination has occurred even
if the plan offers different coverage for various disabilities." Id.
44. Id. at 604.
45. Id. at 605.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
47. Ford, 145 F.3d at 605-06 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (1994)).
48. Id. at 607.
49. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
50. Ford, 145 F.3d at 606.
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employees.5' Finding Title VII precedent relevant to ADA analysis
because the two are "sibling statutes,"52 Ford followed Robinson and
broadly interpreted the ADA's ambiguous provision to include former
employees. 3 The Ford court found this consistent with Robinson's pre-
cedent, and the ADA's comprehensive goal of eliminating discrimination
against individuals with disabilities in all aspects of employment' 4
Ford rejected the reasoning in the two court of appeals cases that
denied relief to former employees, EEOC v. CNA Insurance Cos.5" and
Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc. 6 The Ford court found the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning in CNA faulty because it conflated eligibility
to sue with the merits of the case; finding no merit in the allegation of
discriminatory fringe benefits, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
plaintiff was not eligible to sue.57 Similarly, Ford determined that in
Gonzales, the Eleventh Circuit erred by failing to see the ambiguity
created by the disjunction between the ADA's rights and remedies. 8 The
Ford court rejected the reasoning in both cases and concluded that the
ADA does indeed protect former employees from discrimination in the
provision of post-employment finge benefits.59
In Castellano v. City of New York, the Second Circuit likewise
concluded that former employees collecting retirement disability benefits
were qualified individuals with disabilities under the ADA, and were
therefore eligible to sue their former employer regarding alleged
discrimination in the provision of retirement benefits.' The appeal
consolidated five district court cases brought under the ADA, 6' all
51. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346; see infra Part II.B.1.
52. Ford, 145 F.3d at 606 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(7) (1994) (incorporating Title VII terms into
ADA); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,471).
53. l at 607.
54. Id.
55. 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996); see infra Part IIA.2.
56. 89 F.3d 1523 (1 th Cir. 1996); see infra Part I1.A.2.
57. Ford, 145 F.3d at 607.
58. Id at 608.
59. Id at 607-08.
60. 142 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 1998).
61. Id. at 62-63. The district court cases consolidated on appeal were: Castellano v. City of New
York, 946 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Graboski v. Giuliani, 937 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Clifford v. New York City Police Pension Fund, No. 96 Civ. 6806, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1997);
Adornetti v. New York City Employees'Retirement Systems, No. 95 Civ. 3842, 1996 WL 518097
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1996); Houlihan v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 6373, 1996 WL 393576
(S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1996). After the Second Circuit's decision in Castellano, the litigants in that case
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involving certain retirement benefits that were available only to retirees
not on disability retirement. 62
After noting the statute's ambiguity regarding former employees' right
to sue, the Castellano court turned to statutory interpretation and the
legislative history of the ADA.63 The court looked to the purpose behind
the requirement that the "qualified individual with a disability" be able to
fulfill the essential functions of the position.' According to the
legislative history, that purpose is to ensure that the ADA does not force
employers to hire unqualified employees with disabilities. 65 As long as a
former employee was a "qualified individual with a disability" during the
employment period, the "essential function" requirement was met.66 The
court also found support for its holding in the broad remedial purpose of
the ADA and its comprehensive scope. 67 Finally, the Second Circuit cited
Robinson, noting that Title VII also has a broad remedial purpose and
that courts are to give the term "employee" the same meaning in the
ADA as in Title VII.68 Thus, the court held that the ADA grants retirees a
right to relief.
2. Other Circuits Have Found that Former Employees Have No Right
to Relief Under the ADA
The Seventh Circuit held in EEOC v. CNA Insurance Cos. that a
former employee with a total disability who alleged discrimination in her
employer's long-term disability benefits plan had no right to relief under
the ADA.69 This case involved a former employee whose disability
benefits plan covered physical disability until age sixty-five, but limited
mental disability benefits to two years. 70 The court first rejected the
and in Graboski subsequently petitioned for, and were denied, certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. See
Graboski v. Giuliani, 119 S. Ct. 276 (1998); Castellano v. City of New York, 119 S. Ct. 60 (1998).
62. Castellano, 142 F.3d at 63-64. Only "for-service" retirees, those who had retired after a
certain number of years of service, were eligible for the favorable retirement benefits.
63. Id. at 67.
64. Id. at 67-68.
65. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
337; S. Rep. No. 101-116 (1989), reprinted in Arnold & Porter Legis. History P.L. 101-336,
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989, at 26).
66. Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68.
67. Id.
68. Id, at 69 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., at 349 (1997)).
69. 96 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1996).
70. Id. at 1041.
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argument of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
that "benefit recipient" is an employment position within the scope of the
ADA.7 Although acknowledging that a pension plan may be a "term,
condition or privilege of employment," the court determined that the
pension plan was not discriminatory because the ADA does not prohibit
disparity in coverage between mental and physical disabilities.72 Finally,
the court found inapposite the analogy to the Title VII anti-retaliation
cases in which former employees were allowed to sue former employers
for post-employment retaliatory acts.73 The court concluded that the Title
VII cases are distinguishable because in those cases the employee's
"protected interest" arose during the period of employment, whereas in
CNA nothing discriminatory happened to the plaintiff during her period
of employment.74
Similarly, in Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc., the Eleventh
Circuit held that a former employee with a total disability was not a
"qualified individual with a disability" within the meaning of the ADA
and therefore was not entitled to the statute's protection.75 The plaintiff in
Gonzales, the administrator of an AIDS victim's estate, sued the
decedent's former employer under the ADA, on the ground that the
employer had amended its health insurance plan to place a cap on AIDS-
related treatment after finding out the decedent was infected with HIV.6
The Gonzales court rejected an analogy to Title VII's anti-retaliation
cases because the plaintiff did not allege retaliation.77 The court reasoned
that allowing a former employee with a total disability to sue would
render meaningless the requirement that an individual must be a
"qualified individual with a disability" in order to sue.78 Finally, the court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the decedent met the "qualified
71. Id. at 1044; see also supra Part I.A (defining "qualified individual with a disability").
72. CNA, 96 F.3d at 1044.
73. Id. at 1044-45 (citing Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 1996); Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995) (en bane); Chariton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d
194 (3d Cir. 1994)).
74. Id. at 1045.
75. 89F.3d 1523, 1530-31 (llthCir. 1996).
76. Id. at 1524. The language of the case indicates GFS did not dispute their discriminatory
motive in amending the health plan: "At least partly because of Bourgeois's continued participation
in the health insurance benefit plan after his discharge, GFS amended the plan.., to cap AEDS-
related treatment .... "Id.
77. Id. at 1528-29.
78. Id. at 1529.
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individual with a disability" requirement by performing the essential
functions of his position as health insurance program participant.79
The dissent in Gonzales disputed the majority's opinion that the
ADA's plain language clearly limits protection to current employees.
The dissent argued that the structure of the statute extending protection
to fringe benefits indicates Congress's intent to protect the rights of
individuals covered by such plans."0 To resolve this ambiguity, the
dissent turned to the legislative history and structure of the ADA,8 as
well as case law interpreting Title VII, 2 and determined that the ADA's
protection extends to former employees. The dissent relied on a
"common sense" reading of the ADA to conclude that because many
fringe benefits are to be enjoyed in the post-employment period, a former
employee need only be qualified to receive fringe benefits to be
considered a "qualified individual with a disability." 3
B. Cases Interpreting Former Employees 'Right to Relief Under Other
Employment Discrimination Statutes
The statutory language and definitions in the ADA closely resemble
those of previously enacted employment discrimination statutes. Although
each of these statutes has its own focus,8' they all share the goal of
comprehensive application to end employment discrimination." The ADA
79. Id. at 1530.
80. Id. at 1532-33 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Anderson, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1533 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1535 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
84. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). The ADEA prohibits employment discrimination based on age.
29 U.S.C.A § 623 (1998). The Rehabilitation Act prohibits recipients of federal funds from
discriminating against individuals with disabilities. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (1998). The Fair Labor
Standards Act is a more general employment statute that seeks to establish a minimum standard for
working conditions. 29 U.S.C.A. § 202 (1998). It does, however, contain a provision that forbids
employers from discriminating or retaliating against employees who file complaints about their
employers with the Department of Labor. 29 U.S.C.A. § 215(a)(3) (1998).
85. The U.S. Supreme Court stated:
The ADEA, enacted in 1967 as part of an ongoing congressional effort to eradicate
discrimination in the workplace, reflects a societal condemnation of invidious bias in
employment decisions. The ADEA is but part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees
in the workplace nationwide. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990... the National Labor Relations Act... [and] the Equal Pay Act
of 1963, [incorporated into the FLSA].
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adopts or incorporates by reference many of the definitions of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including that of "person," "labor
organization," "employment agency," and "commerce. 86 The definition of
"employee" in the ADA, as "an individual employed by an employer,"'87 is
virtually identical88 to that in Title VII,'9 the ADEAY0 and the FLSA.9 ' The
anti-discrimination provisions in Title VII and the ADEA are also similar
to the ADA's, generally prohibiting discrimination in hiring and firing,
compensation, and the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.92 In
addition, Title VII and the ADEA prohibit segregating or classifying
employees in any way that deprives them of opportunities, or otherwise
adversely affects their employment status. 3 Similarly, the FLSA prohibits
employers from discharging, or in any other way discriminating, against
employees who, alleging unfair labor practices, file claims against that
employer.94 Finally, the Rehabilitation Act's text does not expressly name
prohibited employment conduct,95 but the EEOC interpretive regulations
implementing the statute share the framework of other employment
discrimination statutes.96 Thus, all of these statutes share a fairly consistent
and comprehensive anti-discrimination scheme.
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352,358 (1995).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(7) (1994).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (1994).
88. The definitions of "employee" under Title VII and the ADEA contain an exception for elected
officials and their employees or appointees, and the FLSA has additional sections defining
employees of public agencies. Otherwise, the statutory definitions are virtually identical. See infra
notes 89-91.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994). ("The term 'employee' means an individual employed by an
employer ... ").
90. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 630(f) (1998). ("The term 'employee' means an individual employed by
any employer... :).
91. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(e)(1) (1998). ("JrMhe term 'employee' means any individual em-
ployed by an employer.").
92. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1) (1998) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (Title VI).
93. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(2) (1998) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2010e-2(a)(2) (1994) (Title VII).
94. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 215(a)(3) (1998). The FLSA does not define "discrimination." See 29
U.S.C.A. § 203 (1998) (defining statutory terms in FLSA). However, the statutory remedies for
violations of § 215(a)(3) include employment, reinstatement, and promotion, suggesting that the
FLSA prohibits the same kinds of conduct prohibited by other employment statutes, for example,
discriminatory discharge, failure to hire, and failure to promote. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (1998).
95. See 29 U.S.C-A. § 794 (1998).
96. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 84.11 (1998) (interpreting Rehabilitation Act), with 29 U.S.C.A §§ 623,
630 (1998) (interpreting ADEA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2 (1994) (interpreting Title VII), and
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12112(a) (1994) (interpreting ADA).
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1. Title VII, ADEA, and FLSA Cases Provide Protection to
Former Employees
In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a
circuit split, ruling that the anti-retaliation provision of Title V11 97
extends to former as well as current employees.98 The Court first found
that the term "employee" was not "plain and unambiguous" because
neither the retaliation provision itself, nor Title VII's definition of
"employee" includes any temporal qualifier specifying whether
"employee" can include a former employee.9 9 In addition, the term
"employee" has different meanings in different provisions of Title VII,
sometimes including employees other than just current employees.'00 To
resolve the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of "employee," the Court
looked at the broad context of Title VIIV'0 Several sections of the statute
contain provisions that make sense only in the context of former
employees, which convinced the Court that the statute's protection extends
to former employees.' Finally, the Court found that excluding former
employees from the protection of Title VII's anti-retaliation statute would
undermine its effectiveness and its primary remedial purpose. 3
Courts have largely agreed that employment discrimination statutes
other than Title VII also protect former employees. In EEOC v. Cosmair,
Inc., ' 4 the Fifth Circuit examined the term "employee" in the context of
the ADEA's anti-retaliation provision. 5 Arguing that "employee" is to
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). The section states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees or applicants for employment.., because [the employee or applicant] has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
98. 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
99. Id. at 340-42.
100. Id. at 324. For example, the statutory reference to "reinstatement or hiring of employees"
necessarily includes former and prospective employees, as reinstating or hiring current employees
makes little sense. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994).
101. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345.
102. Id. For example, Title VII prohibits discriminatory discharge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
Thus, only former employees would bring claims under this provision.
103. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346.
104. 821 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1987).
105. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(d) (1998). The language of this provision is virtually identical to that
in Title VII's antiretaliation statute. See supra note 97.
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be broadly interpreted, the court found that the term includes former
employees as long as the alleged discrimination is "related to" or "arises
out of' the employment relationship. 1 6 Similarly, in Dunlop v. Carriage
Carpet Co., the Sixth Circuit found that the anti-retaliation provision of
the FLSA protected a former employee. 7 The Dunlop court concluded
that to find otherwise would be to disregard the FLSA's broad remedial
purpose.' Thus, case law interpreting Title VII, the ADEA, and the
FLSA affirms that these statutes extend protection to former employees.
2. Rehabilitation Act Case Law Fails to Provide Guidance in
Interpreting "Employee"
The Rehabilitation Act of 19731' 9 prohibits discrimination against
individuals with disabilities participating in federally funded programs."0
The Rehabilitation Act is the ADA's predecessor, and the ADA
incorporates many of the standards promulgated in the Rehabilitation
Act's regulations."' Similar to the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act extends
coverage to "otherwise qualified" individuals with disabilities," 2 and
Congress intended that the scope of protected employment decisions
under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act be consistent."3 Accordingly,
106. Cosmair, 821 F.2d at 1088 (citations omitted); see also Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y,
935 F.2d 322, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing Cosmair, court found that plaintiff "remained protected
by the [ADEA's antiretaliation provision] even after he was forced to retire and ceased to be an
active employee of ACS").
107. 548 F.2d 139, 147 (6th Cir. 1977).
108. Id.; see also Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303, 304,
306 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that because of risk of retaliation, "informer's privilege" under FLSA
extends to statements made by former as well as current employees).
109. 29 U.S.C.A §§ 701-796 (1998).
110. The Rehabilitation Act requires federal agencies to develop affirmative action plans for
recruiting, hiring, and promoting individuals with disabilities, and requires federal agencies to
recommend to state agencies policies and procedures to facilitate employment of individuals with
disabilities. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 791(b)-(c). The Act also prohibits discrimination against persons
with disabilities in any federally funded program or activity, including housing, education, physical
accessibility, and health and social services. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794.
111. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304.
112. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a). The ADA requires that a claimant be a "qualified individual with a
disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
113. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 54 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 336.
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courts have turned to Rehabilitation Act case law when interpreting the
ADA."
4
The one case addressing a post-employment benefit recipient's right
to relief under the Rehabilitation Act"5 departed from the holdings of
other employment discrimination cases. In Beauford v. Father Flanagan s
Boys' Home,"6 the Eighth Circuit determined that the Rehabilitation Act
did not protect an employee with total disability"7 on the grounds that
she was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual.""' 8 Because
the plaintiff's disability did not allow her to perform the essential
functions of her teaching job, the court concluded that the Rehabilitation
Act did not reach her claim of discriminatory disability benefits." 9
III. FORMER EMPLOYEES SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO RELIEF
UNDER THE ADA WHEN EMPLOYERS PROVIDE
DISCRIMINATORY POST-EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
Individuals alleging discriminatory post-employment benefits have a
right to relief under Title I of the ADA. The ADA expressly prohibits
discrimination based on disability in the "terms, conditions, and
114. See, e.g., Munoz v. H & M Wholesale, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 596, 604 (S.D. Tex. 1996);
Harding v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 386, 391 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Haysman v. Food Lion,
Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1102 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
115. Modderno v. King also addresses discriminatory benefits under the Rehabilitation Act. 871
F. Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd, 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The dissent in Gonzales v. Garner
Food Services, Inc. cited Modderno in support of finding post-employment benefits recipients
eligible to sue. 89 F.3d 1523, 1535 (1lth Cir. 1996) (Anderson, J., dissenting). In Modderno, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals recognized that the plaintiff met the Rehabilitation Act's
"otherwise qualified handicapped individual" requirement by virtue of her participation in a federal
health plan. 871 F. Supp. at 42. However, the case is inapposite because the Rehabilitation Act
forbids discrimination in the context of employment and in any federally funded plan or program.
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794. Thus, the plaintiff in Modderno was able to bring a claim under the
Rehabilitation Act simply because she participated in a federal program, not because of her
employment status.
116. 831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987).
117. The Eighth Circuit found that the plaintiff was "apparently" still an employee of Boys Town
at the time of the appeal, although she was unable to work because of mental and physical problems.
Id. at 770. Boys Town had discharged Beauford in 1981, but reinstated her after an arbitrator found
that the discharge did not comply with the procedural requirements of Beauford's employment
contract. Id. at 769-70. After her reinstatement, Beauford told Boys Town that she was unable to
work and applied for disability and health benefits provided by Boys Town. These benefits gave rise
to her claim. Id.
118. Id. at 771.
119. Id
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privileges of employment."' 2 Many of these prerequisites, such as
retirement benefits, disability benefits, or health insurance, arise only in
the post-employment context. Recognizing a former employee's right to
challenge a former employer's discriminatory provision of a post-
employment benefit is the only way to effectuate the ADA's express
protection of the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
Contrary to the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits' overly narrow reading
of the ADA, the "qualified individual with a disability" requirement does
not prohibit post-employment benefits recipients from seeking relief
under the statute. When the employment relationship is construed
broadly to include post-employment benefits recipients, a former
employee can meet the "qualified individual with a disability"
requirement by fulfilling the essential functions of the employment
position of benefits recipient. Alternately, the "qualified individual with
a disability" requirement need not bar relief to post-employment benefits
recipients because the requirement is no longer necessary to protect
employers from being forced to retain or hire unqualified workers.
A. The ADA 's Ambiguity Should Be Resolved in Favor of
Former Employees
1. The ADA Is Ambiguous and Internally Inconsistent with Regard to
Former Employees 'Right to Relief
The text of the ADA is ambiguous in its protection of former
employees. The statute does not expressly address whether or not former
employees may bring a claim, and two relevant sections of the ADA give
conflicting answers. Section 12112(a) of the ADA states: "No covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment."'' Ambiguity arises because this provision's language
limits protection to qualified individuals with disabilities who are able to
perform the essential functions of the job in question. Reading only this
part of section 12112(a), the ADA would appear to preclude relief to
employees with total disabilities or retired employees because they are
120. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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not qualified individuals with disabilities. Indeed, a number of courts
have so held, ending their inquiry into former employees' right to relief
at this point in the analysis.
2 1
However, these decisions have failed to consider the protection
section 12112(a) extends to the "terms, conditions and privileges of
employment."'2 3 This provision includes fringe benefits available by
virtue of employment.2 4 Neither section 12112(a) nor the EEOC
regulations provide an exhaustive list of which fringe benefits fall within
the ADA's protection. However, health insurance is one fringe benefit
expressly included in the EEOC regulations as a term, condition, or
privilege of employment.22 Furthermore, courts have universally
concluded that other benefits, such as126 retirement benefits 2 7 and disability
benefits plans, 12  are "terms, conditions and privileges of employment"
protected by the ADA.2 9 Although these finge benefits, particularly
122. See, e.g., EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1043-45 (7th Cir. 1996); Gonzales v.
Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1530-31 (1 lth Cir. 1996); supra Part II.A.2.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
124. H.R Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 54 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337.
125. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (1998).
126. 29 C.F.tR § 1630.5 (1998). The ADA requires that employers offer employees equal access
to health insurance. However, employers may offer plans with specific limitations such as benefit
caps or pre-existing condition clauses, as long as these limitations apply equally to all employees.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 779-80 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (finding
that although disability-based distinctions in health insurance are allowable, employer violated ADA
by switching to group benefit plan that would not cover HIV-positive employee, thereby completely
denying employee access to health insurance).
127. See, e.g., Horth v. General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 873, 877 (M.D. Pa. 1997)
(finding denial of retirement benefits to be adverse employment action under ADA); Graboski v.
Giuliani, 937 F. Supp. 258, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing pension plans and health insurance as
fringe benefits under ADA).
128. See, e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 604 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding that
disability plan is fringe benefit under ADA), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999); Lewis v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1161 (1997) (same); Schroeder v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., No.
93-M-2433, 1994 WL 909636, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 1994) (same).
129. Title VII has identical language prohibiting discrimination in the terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). Courts evaluating Title VII claims
have also been consistent in recognizing health insurance, retirement, and disability benefits plans as
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. See, e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax
Deferred Annuity v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1079 (1983) (noting that, under Title VII, opportunity to
participate in deferred compensation plan is "term, condition, or privilege" of employment and
retirement benefits are "compensation"); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,
462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983) (stating that "[h]ealth insurance and other fringe benefits are
'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment'" under Title VII); Bartmess v.
Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1189 (7th Cir. 1971) (reading Title VII to include retirement
plan as condition of employment).
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disability and retirement plans, are provided in the period following
employment, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly has recognized that
benefits received exclusively in the period following employment are
nonetheless protected from discrimination."' By expressly protecting the
terms, conditions and privileges of employment, many of which arise
only after employment has ended, the statute extends ADA protection
past the period of active employment. Thus, the ADA is ambiguous
because it covers fringe benefits of individuals who may have total
disabilities, while simultaneously requiring claimants to be qualified
to work.131
2. ADA Legislative History and EEOC Guidelines Reflect Congress's
Intent to Provide Former Employees with a Right to Relief
Because section 12112(a) is internally ambiguous, courts must look
beyond the provision itself when interpreting its terms.' The ADA's
legislative history and EEOC guidelines affirm that courts should
construe the statute broadly to provide former employees with a right to
relief. Neither the legislative history nor the EEOC regulations expressly
address the question of former employees. The legislative history of the
ADA makes clear, however, that Congress intended the Act's scope of
protection to be comprehensive.' The House Report noted that disability-
130. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 77 (1984) (evaluating Title VII claim and noting
that "[a] benefit need not accrue before a person's employment is completed to be a term, condition,
or privilege of that employment relationship. Pension benefits, for example, qualify as terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment even though they are received only after employment
terminates").
131. In addition, interpreting the ADA to exclude protection of post-employment fringe benefits
creates additional ambiguity because such a narrow reading conflicts with the statute's broad intent
of eliminating discrimination in all aspects of employment. See infra Part m.A.2.
132. Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 858 (1st Cir. 1998). Two important
sources of statutory interpretation are legislative history and the interpretation given a statute by the
agency charged with enforcing it. Id.
133. The House Report states:
Where is a compelling need to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities and for the integration of
persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life. Further,
there is a need to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Finally, there is a need to ensure that the
Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing these standards on behalf of individuals
with disabilities.
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332; see supra
Part I.B.
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based discrimination is pervasive and persistent in the employment sphere,
and includes denial of benefits or opportunities to individuals with
disabilities on par with those provided to others. 3 4 As a result, Congress
found a compelling need for clear and comprehensive prohibitions
against discrimination. 35 The EEOC adopted this broad approach,
recognizing that the ADA protects benefit recipients by virtue of the
employment relationship with their former employer.'36 Thus, Congress
and the EEOC have indicated that the ADA is to be construed broadly,
despite the absence of express reference to claims by former employees.
3. Case Law Supports Former Employees 'Right to Sue Under the ADA
Case law supports reading the ADA to cover former employees.
Although courts are split on the issue of former employees' right to
relief, courts interpreting other ambiguous ADA provisions have
observed consistently that the ADA is a remedial statute to be construed
broadly.'37 Accordingly, these courts have applied this rule of broad
construction in interpreting a variety of ADA provisions.'38 A narrow
reading of section 12112(a) that denies relief to post-employment benefit
recipients is inconsistent with ADA precedent.
134. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 310.
135. Id.
136. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Komblau v. Dade County, 86 F.3d 193, 194 (1lth Cir. 1996) (noting ADA is
remedial statute that must be broadly construed to effect its purpose); Anderson v. Gus Mayer
Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 771 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (noting that, "unlike other legislation designed
to settle narrow issues of law, the ADA has a comprehensive reach and should be interpreted with
this goal in mind"); Lincoln CERCPAC v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 488, 497 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (finding that ADA must be construed broadly to effectuate its purpose).
138. See, e.g., Kirkingburg v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting as
inconsistent with expansive goals of ADA defendant's argument that plaintiff blind in only one eye
has no disability under ADA); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 863 (1st Cir. 1998)
(concluding that ADA's remedial purpose indicates that court should evaluate plaintiff's disability
without considering effect of ameliorative medication on underlying condition); Reeves v. Queen
City Transp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1183 (D. Colo. 1998) (noting that "[a]lthough the ADA does not
explicitly define 'services, programs, or activities,' courts broadly construe Title II [of the ADA] as
covering a variety of community services and programs"); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916
F. Supp. 797, 803 (N.D. I11. 1996) (viewing reproduction as "major life activity" protected by ADA
in accordance with canon of broadly construing civil rights statutes to effectuate remedial purposes);
Kinney v. Yerusalim, 812 F. Supp. 547, 551-52 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (broadly construing "alteration"
under Title III of ADA to include resurfacing of street because it affects street's usability and
because resurfacing constitutes "alteration," city must install curb ramps), affld, 9 F.3d 1067 (3d.
Cir. 1993).
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Similarly, most of the case law interpreting other employment
discrimination statutes supports a liberal construction of the ADA's
terms to provide a right to relief for aggrieved former employees. 39 The
ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, Title VII, the ADEA, and the FLSA are all
broad remedial statutes that have virtually identical definitions of
"employee."'40 The ADA's text141 and legislative history 42 explicitly
incorporate many of Title VII's provisions and definitions into the ADA.
Accordingly, in interpreting the ADA, courts have looked to Title VII for
guidance. 43 The ADA does not explicitly incorporate ADEA or FLSA
terms or case law, but it is well established that any statute with a broad
remedial purpose should be construed broadly to effectuate its
purposes.'" Thus, broadly interpreting "employee" comports with the
liberal construction given the term under other employment discrimi-
nation statutes. 14
5
Although much of the case law under Title VII, the ADEA, and the
FLSA focuses on anti-retaliation provisions, 46 the holdings that former
employees are entitled to relief are nonetheless relevant to the ADA's
139. See supra Part II.B.
140. See supra Part II.B.
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(1) & (7), 12117(a) (1994).
142. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 54 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,336.
143. See, e.g., Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 16 (lst Cir.
1994) (looking to Title VII for guidance in evaluating ADA claim); DeJoy v. Comcast Cable
Communications, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 468, 474-75 (D.N.J. 1996) (looking to Title VII for guidance in
interpreting "employer" under ADA); Miller v. CBC Cos., 908 F. Supp. 1054, 1065 (D.N.H. 1995)
(looking to Title VII to determine whether supervisors were personally liable under ADA).
144. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (holding that in construing "security" under
Securities Exchange Act, Court must be "guided by familiar canon of statutory construction that
remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes") (emphasis added).
145. The one Rehabilitation Act case that addressed the right of employees with total disabilities
to relief concluded that the Act did not extend to former employees. Beauford v. Father Flanagan's
Boys Home, 831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987); see supra Part ILB.2. However, this holding suffers from
the same flawed reasoning and unduly narrow statutory interpretation as the holdings in EEOC v.
CNA Insurance Cos., 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996), and Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc., 89
F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996). The Beauford court found dispositive the Rehabilitation Act's
requirement that a claimant be an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual." 831 F.2d at 771
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 794). Without considering the broad range of employment decisions targeted by
the Rehabilitation Act, the court concluded that discrimination in benefits, while "undesirable," was
not within the scope of the statute. Such a narrow construction of the Rehabilitation Act's terms
disregards the Act's broad remedial purpose. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 641 (2d Cir.
1991) (noting that Rehabilitation Act is to be interpreted broadly).
146. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997); Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y,
935 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1987); Dunlop v.
Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977).
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coverage of post-employment benefit recipients. The anti-retaliation
cases have noted ambiguity in the statutory language and resolved that
ambiguity in keeping with the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision in
particular, 147 and the broad remedial purpose of employment discrimination
statutes in general.'48 Thus, although the substantive right protected in anti-
retaliation cases (freedom to file charges without fear of retaliation) differs
from the substantive right protected by the ADA in these cases (right to
nondiscriminatory fringe benefits), the analysis and conclusion are
analogous. Courts would properly interpret the ADA by extending its
protection to former employees.
B. The "Qualified Individual with a Disability" Requirement Can Be
Reconciled with the ADA 's Intent to Protect Former Employees
Courts should not use the ADA's "qualified individual with a
disability" requirement to deny relief to former employees. There are two
ways to reconcile the "qualified individual with a disability" requirement
with the ADA's coverage of former employees. First, a court can
construe a retiree or post-employment benefits recipient to be a valid
employment position protected by the ADA, entitling such an individual
to judicial recourse. Alternately, because the "qualified individual with a
disability" requirement serves no purpose in the post-employment
context, its use properly can be limited to evaluating claims involving
prospective or current employment. Although each of these approaches
has merit, the former is preferable because it comports with the prepon-
derant employment discrimination case law and provides courts with a
uniform framework for evaluating ADA claims.
1. Recognizing "Benefits Recipient" as an Employment Position
Satisfies the "Qualified Individual with a Disability'" Requirement
Because it is appropriate to construe broadly the ADA's provisions,
one way to satisfy the "qualified individual with a disability"
requirement is to recognize post-employment benefits recipient as a valid
employment position. The plaintiff in EEOC v. CNA Insurance Cos.
relied on this logic, arguing that because the only essential function of
the benefits recipient position was the ability to receive disability
147. See, e.g., Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346; Dunlop, 548 F.2d at 147.
148. See, e.g., Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346; Dunlop, 548 F.2d at 147.
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benefits, the former employee qualified for that position.'49 The court,
however, rejected this argument, stating that an "employment position"
is a job, and as a result, only current employees and applicants are
covered. 5 ° This unduly narrow conclusion completely disregards the
ADA's broad remedial purpose.''
In contrast to the Gonzales and CNA courts, most courts have
construed the employment relationship broadly and have refused to
limit statutory protection to narrowly defined employer-employee
relationships. In Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 2 the Seventh Circuit
found that Title VII protects former employees against retaliation that
affects future employment prospects or has some other link to
employment.'53 Similarly, in EEOC v. South Dakota Wheat Growers
Ass'n, the district court considered whether Title VII governed a health
insurance policy provided to a former employee as a consequence of
employment.'54 The Wheat Growers court rejected a strict interpretation
of the employment relationship, finding discrimination arising out of the
employment relationship within the scope of Title VII regardless of the
employee's status as a current or former employee at the time of the
discriminatory conduct.'55 The insurance policy was offered as a result of
the plaintiff's employment status and therefore discrimination was a
149. CNA, 96 F.3d at 1043-44.
150. Id. at 1044.
151. Like the CNA plaintiff, the dissent in Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc. argued that
"employment position" should be construed broadly, and the "qualified individual with a disability"
analysis applied to the former employee in the benefits recipient position. 89 F.3d 1523, 1535 (1 1th
Cir. 1996) (Anderson, J., dissenting). The dissent further stated:
[I]t is obvious that retirees and other former employees, who because of their prior employment
are entitled to participate in post-employment fringe benefit plans, are not expected to perform
the functions of the job they previously held before retirement. Rather, they are expected to meet
whatever criteria are mandated by the fringe benefits plan for the accrual and continuation of
coverage, including, for example, any required minimum years of employment, honorable
discharge, and the payment of premiums.
Id. (Anderson, J., dissenting).
152. 87 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 1996). This is a pre-Robinson case considering the right of former
employees to sue under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.
153. Id. at 891. For example, retaliatory termination of post-employment fringe benefits would
violate this provision because fringe benefits are linked to employment.
154. 683 F. Supp. 1302, 1304 (D.S.D. 1988).
155. Id. at 1304-05 (citing Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978)).
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direct result of the employment relationship.'56 Courts have reached
similar conclusions in ADEA and FLSA cases.
57
The EEOC, the agency charged with implementing Title I of the
ADA, also recognizes that an employment position encompasses more
than a "job." Although the EEOC regulations are silent on former
employees' eligibility to sue under the ADA,58 the EEOC has argued as
plaintiff or amicus in a number of ADA cases that "post-employment
benefit recipient" is an employment position subject to the ADA's
protection. 59 The EEOC's recognition of a broadly defined employment
relationship, while not controlling on the courts, is entitled nonetheless to
some deference even absent codified regulations. 6 ° The EEOC's
inclusive definition is a reasonable interpretation of the statute; this
interpretation accords with the ADA's broad remedial purpose 6' as well
as the majority of employment discrimination case law.
Once courts acknowledge that a former employee has an employment
relationship with the former employer, it is logical to recognize "benefits
recipient" as the most accurate description of that employee's status. This
"title" reflects the individual's unique position: no longer an active
employee, but still the beneficiary of a statutorily protected tie to the
former employer. An employee's transfer from an assembly line to a
desk job within the same company would certainly affect the "qualified
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1088 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that in
ADEA claim, term "employee" includes former employees "as long as the alleged discrimination is
related to or arises out of the employment relationship"); Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d
139, 144-47 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that court should construe "employee" broadly to include
former employee under FLSA, in keeping with that statute's broad policies and intentions).
158. See supra note 17.
159. See, e.g., Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 1998); Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 186-87 (6th Cir. 1996), vacated on rehg, 107 F.3d 359
(6th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 1996); Gonzales v.
Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1529-30 (11th Cir. 1996).
160. Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., courts should defer
to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged to enforce, as long as the
agency's interpretation is "based on a permissible construction of the statute." 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984). While the issue in Chevron was judicial deference to agency regulations, other courts have
found that less formal agency interpretations of statutes are also entitled to "some level" of
deference. See, e.g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (holding that "internal agency guideline"
is to be given "some deference" because it is permissible construction of statute); Massachusetts v.
FDIC, 102 F.3d 615, 621 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that informal administrative practices or newly
announced policies are entitled to some deference even if"not yet reduced to specific regulations").
161. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
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individual with a disability" analysis, as the essential job functions and
necessary employee skills depend on the job in question. Likewise, it
would be illogical to consider the essential functions of a post-
employment benefits recipient's former job when evaluating whether the
"qualified individual with a disability" requirement is met.
Limiting the ADA's protection of former employees to those who are
in an "employment relationship"-collecting benefits from a former
employer-disarms one of the Gonzales court's fears. The Gonzales
court opined that "interpreting the ADA to allow any disabled former
employee to sue a former employer essentially renders the ['qualified
individual with a disability'] requirement... meaningless."'" However,
the court overlooked one important feature: plaintiffs in these cases are
in employment relationships with former employers. Plaintiffs still
receive benefits from former employers, and the benefits themselves are
the subject of the claims. Allowing benefits recipients to sue in no way
suggests that a former employee with a total disability and no ongoing
relationship with the former employer can bring a claim alleging past
discriminatory treatment. Thus, the requirement that the former employee
still have an employment relationship with the former employer will
preclude the flood of litigation the Eleventh Circuit apparently feared.
By recognizing "retiree" or "post-employment benefits recipient" as
an employment position within the context of the ADA, the statute's
"qualified individual with a disability" requirement is met. The ADA's
legislative history, case law, and the EEOC's stance all require broad
construction of the terms "qualified individual with a disability" and
"employment position."'63 Precedent involving other remedial employment
discrimination statutes also supports this approach."6 Thus, the "qualified
individual with a disability" requirement can be reconciled with the right of
employees who have total disabilities or are retired to sue under the ADA.
2. The "Qualified Individual with a Disability" Requirement Is
Unnecessary to Protect Employers Following Employment
The "qualified individual with a disability" requirement is an artificial
barrier to relief for post-employment benefits recipients because the
requirement no longer serves a function in the post-employment context.
162. Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1529; see also supra notes 75-79.
163. See supra Part HI.A.2.
164. See supra Part llI.A.3.
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The purpose of the "qualified individual with a disability" and "essential
function" requirements is to ensure that the ADA does not force employers
to hire or retain unqualified workers.'65 When a former employee sues to
challenge discrimination in benefits, there is no threat that the employer's
ability to choose qualified workers will be compromised. Instead, it is the
former employee whose rights must be protected. Courts misconstrue the
ADA when they use the "qualified individual with a disability"
requirement to bar relief to former employees.
By recognizing that the "qualified individual with a disability"
requirement is meaningful only in the context of current or prospective
employment, much of the ADA case law denying relief to former
employees is distinguishable from cases involving post-employment
benefits recipients. For example, one of the most common ADA claims is
wrongful discharge on the basis of disability.'66 Related cases include
those in which claimants allege that they were not hired or not promoted
because of disability. 67 In these contexts, the "qualified individual with a
disability" and "essential functions" requirements are clearly meaningful,
and the purpose of including such a requirement in the statute is evident.
The "qualified individual with a disability" requirement is a valid and
necessary screen to protect an employer from a groundless claim brought
by a discharged or not-hired worker who was unable to perform the
essential functions of the job in question. Thus, much of the case law
precluding relief to employees with total disabilities can be
distinguished. Such case law fails to consider the difference between a
wrongful discharge claim in which ability to perform the essential
functions of the previously held job is relevant, and a discriminatory
benefits claim where ability to perform job functions is wholly irrelevant.
Other ADA cases distinguishable from post-employment benefits
recipients cases are those involving the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Like
wrongful discharge cases, judicial estoppel cases are sometimes cited in
support of the argument that former employees with total disabilities are
165. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 93 (3d Cir. 1995); White v. York Int'l
Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 359 (10th Cir. 1995); Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1336, 1338
(N.D. Cal. 1997); EEOC v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F. Supp. 419,422 (W.D. Va. 1996).
167. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 856 (1st Cir. 1998) (alleging
unlawful failure to hire based on disability); Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 950
(3d Cir. 1996) (same); Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 880 (6th Cir. 1996)
(alleging unlawful failure to promote based on disability); Buchanan v. City of San Antonio, 85 F.3d
196, 197 (5th Cir. 1996) (alleging unlawful failure to hire based on disability).
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not protected by the ADA. 6' The judicial estoppel doctrine arises when
employees represent to the Social Security Administration (or some
comparable agency) that they have total disabilities while simultaneously
bringing ADA wrongful discharge claims against former employers on
the ground that they are in fact qualified individuals with disabilities. 69
Many jurisdictions have ruled that a former employee who claims to
have a total disability is not a "qualified individual with a disability," and
therefore has no prima facie ADA case against the former employer. 7 °
Again, it is evident that the "qualified individual with a disability"
requirement is meaningful and necessary in this context; an employee
who claims to one party to have a total disability and be unable to work
should not be allowed to assert simultaneously to another party that he or
she is in fact a qualified individual entitled to relief for wrongful
discharge. Thus, assertions such as "a person unable to work is not
intended to be, and is not, covered by the ADA"'' may be persuasive in
judicial estoppel cases, but such statements overlook post-employment
discrimination where inability to work is simply not an issue.
3. The Better Approach Is to Construe the Statute Broadly and
Recognize "Benefits Recipient" as an Employment Position
Although both of the above approaches for reconciling the "qualified
individual with a disability" requirement with allowing former
employees to sue are legally sound, recognizing post-employment
benefit recipient as an employment position is the better approach. The
other approach-recognizing that the "qualified individual with a
disability" requirement serves no purpose in the post-employment
context-is valuable because it distinguishes other ADA cases denying
relief to former employees with total disabilities. It also demonstrates
how a "qualified individual with a disability" analysis necessarily
168. See, e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 605 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting
defendant's analogy to judicial estoppel case, McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618-19
(3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958 (1997)), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999); Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 187 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing McNemar as support for denying
ADA relief to former employees), vacated on reh'g, 107 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
169. See Marney Collins Sims, Comment, Estop It! Judicial Estoppel and Its Use in Americans
with Disabilities Act Litigation, 34 Hous. L. Rev. 843, 844 (1997).
170. See id. at 845. Not all jurisdictions accept the judicial estoppel argument as a defense to an
ADA claim. See id The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve this issue. Cleveland v.
Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 39 (1998).
171. McNemar, 91 F.3d at 618.
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depends on the type of claim being brought. Nonetheless, the first
approach-broadly construing the employment relationship-is
preferable for several reasons. First, it comports with judicial precedent
endorsing broad construction of the employment relationship when
interpreting remedial legislation. Second, while the other approach
makes sense of the ADA's contradictory provisions, it essentially calls
for a court to apply the statutory definition of a qualified individual with
a disability in some situations (current or prospective employment), but
not in others (post-employment). The first scheme has the advantage of
allowing uniform application of the ADA's terms in all types of claims-
claims involving prospective employment, current employment, as well
as post-employment. Thus, by broadly construing the employment
relationship to recognize the employment position of "benefits
recipient," the framework for evaluating ADA claims remains consistent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Retired individuals or those with total disabilities who receive post-
employment benefits from former employers must be allowed to challenge
discriminatory fringe benefits. An unduly narrow reading of the ADA that
denies relief to such individuals is unfounded. The ambiguity inherent in the
statute demands that the ADA's legislative history and broad purpose be
guidelines for resolving the ambiguity in favor of recognizing former
employees' right to relief. Reading the statute to preclude relief to an
individual who worked despite a disability, earned the fringe benefits that
accompany employment, and then suffered discrimination when the benefits
were most needed is inconsistent with the ADA's goal. Allowing post-
employment benefits recipients their day in court is necessary to meet the
ADA's goal of comprehensive protection from disability-based employment
discrimination.
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